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Abstract

COMPARE is the software model used to estimate Most Efficient Organization
(MEO) labor costs during A-76 competitions and does an adequate job of cost estimation
for units that provide generally low level technology services, labor and supervision to
organizations. With Outsourcing and Privatization (O&P) being considered across a
wider cross section of organizations, COMPARE may be unable to provide a comparable
picture of MEO costs suitable for use in source selection.

The purpose of this research will be to identify common characteristics of more
complex studies, specifically, the Air Force depot workload competitions at San Antonio
Air Logistics Center (SA-ALC) and Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SM-ALC), and to
highlight cost comparison factors that may not be adequately addressed in the
COMPARE model. Once identified, an analysis of the underlying reasons for the
difference in cost factors between models will be conducted. Results from research will
confirm the current model (COMPARE) or will provide the basis for support and
development of a new cost model.

Research design for this thesis will focus on case study methodology identified by
Robert K.. Yin in his book CASE STUDY RESEARCH Design and Methods (1994).
Details are outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

COMPARE AND COMPLEXITY - WHEN IS COMPARE NOT ENOUGH?

I.

Introduction

Overview

Problem Statement
With an increased emphasis on achieving greater efficiencies in government
operations through the introduction of competition, Outsourcing and Privatization (O&P)
is now considered across a significantly wider cross-section of organizations. Over the
last decade, O&P initiatives (i.e. Public-Private Competition and A-76 Studies) have
thinned the range of candidates to the point where further competitions are becoming
increasingly difficult to model within the constraints of the current A-76 costing model
(COMPARE). Specifically, the standardized cost factors used in COMPARE are
increasingly insufficient in providing a level playing field on which decision makers can
make informed comparisons.
Identifying the gaps between cost factors in COMPARE and those commonly
seen in Public-Private competition is the primary thrust of this research effort. Baseline
cost factors will be identified as those used in the COMPARE model. With the exception
of the Direct Conversion O&P option, the factors found in COMPARE represent the most
basic form of comparison. On the other end of the spectrum are the cost factors used in
Public-Private competition comparisons. In this study, cost factors from two Air Force
depot Public-Private competitions will be used as a basis of comparison to the baseline

factors found in COMPARE. Exploration of this range of factors should provide
significant insight into the limitations of the baseline cost factors, thereby increasing
awareness of considerations for future O&P initiatives.
Overarching Issues
Behind the impetus of O&P are many high level concepts regarding the
appropriate relationships between business and government, their associated roles, and
the means by which workload is delineated (i.e. organic/government or inorganic/private
party). The following discussion provides a range of reactions to O&P trends.
"It is in service delivery that competition yields results - because competition is
the one force that gives public agencies no choice but to improve" (8:55). This statement
describes what has, over time, become a topic of contention between those charged with
creating policy and those who must conduct business within its boundaries.
Budget cuts and business process reform have resulted in an increased interest in
O&P over the last 50 years; especially with the resurgence of acquisition reform over the
last decade. John P. White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the
Secretaries of the Military Services, made the claim that O&P activities provide a means
to achieve critical military objectives of maintaining a modern and ready force (10:
Appendix 2). Success is measured in the ability to meet National Security Objectives
with smaller budgets, a smaller force structure, continued readiness, and modernization
(10:2).
The Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG), in a report titled
Contractors on the Battlefield makes the following observation, "If contractors leave

their jobs during a crisis or hostile situation, the readiness of vital defense systems and
the ability of the Armed Forces to perform their assigned missions would be jeopardized"
(9:1). Cynthia Robertson, in research for USAF Air Command and Staff College
(ACSC) poses the hypothesis that the DoD, in reaction to renewed emphasis on
"reinventing government", is making "the classic mistake of incongruity between
military objectives and the national objectives" in implementing outsourcing initiatives
(9:5).

Research Scope
Public-Private competition, A-76, and Direct Conversion are the three processes
that will be examined in this research effort. Public-Private competition is a grass-roots
acquisition strategy whose genesis is business process improvement. It may involve new
missions or it may include any activity where the Air Force believes there are
opportunities for improvements to efficiency and cost. A multitude of businesses and
government agencies can compete for the work. In this thesis, Public-Private competition
at two Air Force depots will be examined and contrasted with COMPARE model. The
A-76 process narrows the field by focusing on competition between an in-house
(government) bidder and commercial organizations. Finally, the Direct Conversion
process is simply one that allows organizations to streamline conversion in cases where
only a limited number of positions are affected. The underlying criterion requires only
activities with fewer than 10 employees be considered for this strategy.

With the exception of Direct Conversion, each of these strategies represents a
considerable investment in time and money. Intangible costs, such as employee morale
and disruption of work, are also prevalent.

Research Questions
The following questions distil the purpose of this research into its most basic
elements. Individually, the answers to these questions will provide insight into the
important cost factors for each type of O&P initiative. Taken as a whole, they provide
insight into the potential shortcomings of COMPARE when competitions become
increasingly complex.
1. What are the baseline cost comparison factors established in COMPARE?
2. What are the common cost factors found in the Air Force Depot Public-Private
competitions?
3. What are the similarities and differences between the cost factors established in
COMPARE and those used in the Air Force Depot Public-Private competitions?
4. What explains the differences between the cost factors established in COMPARE
and those used in the Air Force Depot Public-Private competitions?
5. What changes can be made to make COMPARE more robust in the comparison of
more complex public and private entities?
Document Structure
The literature review, presented in Chapter II, provides an in-depth examination
of relevant literature and defines a focus for the reader regarding the questions posed in
Chapter I. Chapter III develops the methodology from which to measure the validity of
conclusions drawn from accomplished research. Data Analysis, Chapter IV, provides a

step-by-step breakdown of the cost factors under examination. Relationships between
factors as well as significant differences will be identified and discussed. Chapter V
presents a summary of research and results and offers conclusions and recommendations
regarding the use of the COMPARE model.

II.

Literature Review

"Many argue that it is competition itself that reduces costs and improves
service delivery, not whether a public or private sector entity ends up
winning the competition" (19:Foreword).
Introduction
This section is an overview of literature that is pertinent to the research questions
posed in Chapter I. This section begins by providing a contextual framework to aid the
reader in understanding the background and operating environment of Outsourcing and
Privatization (O&P). Regulatory guidance for Air Force O&P implementation is then
provided to further refine the direction of research. The section continues by providing
both background and details regarding Public-Private competitions, A-76 studies, and the
Direct Conversion process. A summary is provided to recap the highlights of the section.

Contextual Framework
The study of any subject is incomplete without a solid understanding of its
operating environment. For O&P, this environment is a labyrinth of policy and
regulatory guidance designed to impress governmental intent upon those organizations
charged with its execution. The following discussion provides a review of the O&P
environment.
Outsourcing versus Privatization
Federal policy directs its departments to identify candidate organizations for O&P
(13:1). While used interchangeably throughout both public and private documentation,
O&P involves two very different constructs. Privatization involves "shifting the

production of a good or the provision of a service from the government to the private
sector, often by selling government assets" (11). Outsourcing, on the other hand,
involves the "transfer of a support function traditionally performed by an in-house
organization to an outside service provider, with the government continuing to provide
appropriate oversight" (12). The key difference is the complete divestiture of work or
assets by the government during privatization.
Privatization or Public-Private Competition
In order to understand the context of the privatization/Public-Private competition
question, it is important to be able to differentiate between them. Privatization assumes
that the public sector will always be more efficient, more effective, or will provide higher
quality goods or services than a government organization. Public-Private Competition
makes no such a priori assumptions (3:51). In reviewing the history of A-76
implementation, this contextual distinction is helpful in determining the intentions of
policy makers.
The Outsourcing & Privatization Model
The model in Figure 1 represents the relationship between different mechanisms
for O&P For the purpose of this paper, the Air Force will be divided in to two parts:
Core Activities and Commercial Activities. Commercial Activities (CA's) are candidates
for O&P and can be divided into three sub-categories (13). These include Public-Private
Competition, A-76, and Direct Conversion. Direct Conversion plays a minor role since it
is generally limited to actions where there are fewer than 10 employees being considered

for outsourcing (1). Public-Private Competitions and A-76 comparisons, however, play a
major role in the government's O&P agenda.
Many functions, such as combat operations or intelligence, are inherently
governmental in nature. These activities, where it is in the best interest of the nation, are
not candidates for performance by non-governmental employees and are considered to be
Core Activities by the Air Force. Other activities, such as grounds maintenance or
custodial work, are not inherently governmental and are considered candidates for
outsourcing. This study will focus on CA's not considered inherently a governmental
function.
Identification as a CA does not necessarily mean that an organization's mission or
function will automatically be privatized or outsourced. Identification is simply the first
step in determining the most cost effective and efficient manner in which to conduct
business. The cost comparison may indicate that retaining the mission in-house, by
uniformed military or government civilians, provides the most effective use of resources.
Within this framework, there are two primary strategies for determining the most
beneficial outcome. These include Public-Private competition and the A-76 process.
A-76 refers to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular A-76 (1). The
following diagram details the relationships between the concepts discussed to this point.

Outsourcing
&

Privatization

Figure 1- Outsourcing and Privatization Model
Exemptions to A-76
The following activities have been identified as exempt from consideration for
conversion (2:7):
1. Activities involving national defense or intelligence security.
2. Activities that perform patient care when needed to maintain a certain quality
of direct patient care.
3. Core capabilities necessary to fulfill mission responsibilities or meet
emergency requirements.
4. Recurring and severable activities that perform research and development.
5. No satisfactory commercial source is available.
6. Functions with 10 or fewer full-time equivalent (FTE) employees.

7. Activities where generally recognized industry performance and cost
standards are not sufficient to meet governmental minimums.
8. Activities where it is more cost effective (as determined through a formal cost
comparison) to perform in-house.
9. Temporary authorizations for in-house performance in the event of contractor
default or termination.

Outsourcing and Privatization - Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 38-6
Air Force Policy Directive 38-6 is the guiding policy for institutionalizing optimal
use of private and public resources (13:1). In order to concentrate its resources in areas
most directly linked to achieving its core competencies the Air Force has developed four
goals for O&P and has integrated them into the Air Force Outsourcing and Privatization
Strategic Plan. These goals are to sustain readiness, improve performance and quality,
generate funds for force modernization, and focus resources on core missions (13:12).
The "vision" and "mission" in AFPD 38-6 include:
Vision - an Air and Space Force whose premier war fighting capability
and corporate culture are inextricably linked to the optimum use of
national resources (13:12).
Mission - to institutionalize the Air Force's optimum use of public and
private resources by selecting the best source, either internal or external, to
meet Air Force Requirements (13:12).
AFPD 38-6 provides an excellent summation regarding the importance of O&P,
"Because future capabilities of the Air Force depend so strongly on the success of O&P,
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vigorous senior leadership involvement at all echelons of command and at all phases of
this critical program is imperative" (13:14).
The preceding discussion prepares the stage for examining O&P mechanisms, and
associated cost factors, in detail. By understanding national and Air Force intent for
O&P, an individual is better prepared to identify the specific issues involved in
identification of appropriate cost factors.

Public-Private Competition
Of the three types of O&P mechanisms available, the Public-Private Competition
(or Managed Competition) provides the broadest opportunity for organizations seeking
the best value for the Government. The grass-root studies conducted for these
competitions allow for the greatest expression of what constitutes a "best value." Eggers
espouses this benefit of managed competition because it allows the "widest possible
range of competition between different types of providers and is the best way of ensuring
high-quality services at the lowest price with guaranteed performance" (20:1).
According to Martin (19:7), over 30% of municipal and county governments
nationwide are utilizing Public-Private competition. He further states that similar studies
by the Council of State Governments highlight an increase in state departments and
agencies. The trend, of capitalizing on competition, is also self evident at the national
level, including within the Air Force where Public-Private competitions are increasingly
implemented.
A major benefit to Public-Private competitions is that they are not limited to the
less flexible categories outlined in A-76 procedures, though there is growing evidence
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that hybrid actions, such as the Business Analysis conducted for the 89th Airlift Wing
(Andrews AFB), are gaining support. At Andrews, a waiver for A-76 procedures was
approved to allow inclusion of several non-standard cost factors to be used in the
COMPARE model.
Definition
Martin defines Public-Private competition in this way, "government procurement
and quasi-procurement type situations in which the public sector competes with the
private sector to provide government services" (19:7). He further states that "PublicPrivate competition is a maturation of privatization and contracting out (outsourcing)
initiatives" as discussed earlier in this section.
Forms ofPublic-Private Competition
Martin further explains his understanding of Public-Private competition by
breaking it down into three distinct forms. These include the Ad-Hoc Approach,
Informal Bidding, and Formal Bidding (19:7). The Ad-Hoc Approach refers to a
situation where public sector service delivery is simply compared to private sector service
delivery. Informal Bidding is the process by which the public sector submits informal
bids or proposals that are compared to formal bids and proposals submitted by the private
sector. Finally, Martin discusses Formal Bidding, the process whereby the public sector
submits formal bids and proposals that are compared with formal bids and proposals
submitted by the private sector.
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Ensuring a Level Playing Field in Public-Private Competition
An underlying assumption of the O&P effort is the idea that competition will
reduce costs and improve service delivery. An important economic assumption
associated with competition is that there are many sellers (22:57). Many sellers, in
theory, cause prices to be driven to a fair market value. This fair market price is the price
that the government seeks to receive in any transaction, contract, or competition it is
involved with.
The concept of competition is critical to discussions regarding O&P mechanisms
and their associated cost factors because if the factors are perceived as unfair, potential
bidders will be reluctant to expend the necessary resources to participating in
competitions. According to Dr. Lawrence Martin, "Depending on where one sits, there is
wide disagreement about whether the 'playing field' is tilted to one sector or another"
(19:4). William Eggers, Director of Privatization and Government Reform at the Reason
Public Policy Institute, supports this view in stating, "increasingly, private providers are
crying foul, arguing that the playing field is usually tilted against them in Public-Private
competitions" (20: Executive Summary). He further emphasizes the necessity for
competitive neutrality, "A competitively neutral competition policy requires that in-house
units of government should not enjoy a net competitive advantage over their privatesector counterparts simply by virtue of public-sector ownership. At the same time, to the
extent possible, institutional constraints that hamper the public-sector unit's ability to
increase productivity, and therefore effectively compete with the private sector, should be
eliminated" (20:Executive Summary).
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Paul Meyer, Executive Director of the Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors
of California (CELSOC) adds reality to the picture in his statement " Leveling the
playing field may sound fine in theory, but in practice it just never happens. In actual
fact, we have never witnessed a single example of a truly level playing field involving
public and private-sector competition" (20:2). Michael Gagliardo, Executive Director of
the Urban Water Institute of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, adds to this claim in saying
"While you can't get to a 100% even playing field, you can get close" (20:2).
Major Level Playing Field Issues
In trying to level the field in terms of Public-Private competitions, Both Martin
and Eggers have outlined factors that they consider important in conducting a fair
evaluation. Alan Laverson adds his insights in the very focused area of overhead rates.
These factors provide our first look at the types of cost factors we should seek when
evaluating the cases in this study.
Martin provides numerous ideas that pertain to achieving a level playing field.
Of particular importance to this research are the following highlights.
1. Mandated Private Sector Wage Scales - Inclusion of artificial wage scales causes
the public sector to be more competitive because they do not have the same
incentive to improve service quality or reduce cost as a private entity (19:12).
2. Mandated Private Sector Employee Benefits - For similar reasons as the
mandated wage scales, mandated benefits tilt the field in favor of the public sector
(19:14).
3. Minimum Cost Savings Thresholds - This advantage is significant to the public
sector and is especially true when large dollar competitions are involved. On top
of achieving efficiencies to meet the public entry, a private firm must add profit.
An additional 5% or 10%, due to thresholds, can be a significant barrier to entry
(19:14).
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4. Cost Comparison Approach - Martin claims this to be the most critical of the
leveling issues. The problem is that choice of methodology determines what
public sector costs will/will not be included in the analysis. Two types are
typical. These are the "fully allocated" approach and the "avoidable cost"
approach. Martin recommends a hybrid approach whereby unavoidable costs of
public sector delivery are added to the cost of private sector delivery. This
"Texas" approach results in a competitively neutral position (19:14-15).
5. Transition Costs - These are one time conversion costs and should be added to the
cost of delivery for the current non-performing competitors (19:15).
6. Contract Administration and Monitoring Costs - This type of cost includes all
activities that are involved in the oversight, management, or administrative needs
of service delivery (19:16).
7. Penalties for Public Sector Failure to Perform - Like risk and the associated
liability found in a private sector contract, there should be provisions to level the
field for the public entry for failure to perform contractual work (19:17).
Advantages and Disadvantages
Eggers provides the following list of advantages and disadvantages that are
inherent in government bids (20:2). The cost factors of interest are at the root of these
items.
•

Public Advantages
1. Public entities enjoy a lower cost of capital.
2. Public entities pay little or no taxes.
3. They don't have to earn profit, rate-of-return on investments, or depreciation
expenses.
4. They have first hand knowledge of operations.
5. Public entrants enjoy sovereign immunity/indemnification.
6. Public organizations are typically self insured.
7. They are usually exempted from some laws and regulations.
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8. Situations arise where there are close relationships with the staff evaluating bids.
•

Public Disadvantages
1. Regulatory guidance imposes unusually inflexible work rules.
2. Public entities have to bid cost with little benefit from accurate accounting data.
3. Public agencies are subject to rigid procurement and personnel rules.
4. They experience higher employee benefit levels. This is differentiated from
Martin's previous statement that mandated benefits tilt the field in favor of the
public sector. Martin's point is that there is no flexibility in achieving efficiencies
when benefits are dictated to a private offerer.
5. They lack direct access to capital markets.
6. Public entities face constitutional and statutory constraints.
7. They have less economies of scale.
8. They cannot move quickly on capital spending.

Overhead Rates
In his dissertation, A Study of Overhead Rate Behavior at a U.S. Air Force Base
in the Context of A-76 Competitions (1999), Laverson provides very specific focus on
overhead rates as they apply to outsourcing decisions. He states; "Overhead costs can be
a significant factor when deciding if a commercial activity can be performed more
economically by a contractor or the government" (21:13).
Laverson's work is pertinent to this research because the 12% "default" overhead
rate used in COMPARE has no analytical basis to support it (21:25). The COMPARE
software (and associated guidance) makes provisions for use of a different rate, though
this option is seldom exercised. This critical cost factor plays a large role in the bid
amounts of private entities but is defaulted to 12% for public entrants. If this rate is
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inaccurate, in-house estimates will be overstated when their actual rates are lower
(21:25). The converse is equally true. Given the established DoD goal to conduct A-76
competitions involving more that 170,000 positions from 1999-2005, the mistake of
erroneous outsourcing decisions could result in the loss of tens of millions of dollars
(21:25).
Laverson provides a telling example in relating a story whereby the General
Accounting Office (GAO) asked the Air Force to analyze 33 competitions (1990-96) that
were won by public entities. The analysis determined that 12 of the 33 would have been
won by the private sector had the 12% rule been in effect (21:26). This is significant
considering the dubious basis for the 12% value. Incorrectly assessing overhead is a
factor that cannot be overlooked when discussing a level playing field.

OMB Circular A-76
OMB Circular A-76 - Performance of Commercial Activities, and its antecedent
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) documents, is the manifestation of Federal policy on the
conduct of Commercial Activities (3:51). Federal policy on the conduct of Commercial
Activities can be summarized into the following basic principles (1:1-2).
Commercial Activities Principles of Conduct
Achieve Economy and Enhance Productivity. A fundamental truth in business is
that competition spawns improvement in efficiency and productivity. When the
government performs a function in-house, it is operating in a competition-free
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environment. By introducing competition, via the commercial sector or other
government agencies, significant savings can be achieved.
Retain Governmental Functions In-House. There are certain functions of
government that must remain separate from the commercial domain. It is in the best
interest of a nation to maintain armed forces, as an extension of its ability to enforce
policy, free from business motives of commercial enterprise.
Rely on the Commercial Sector. Whenever an activity or service is determined to
be non-inherently governmental, it becomes a candidate for outsourcing to the
commercial sector. The assumptions made on the achievement of economy and
enhancement of productivity now come into play.
Government Perspective
In order to understand the current environment of A-76, it is important to
understand the perspective with which the Government views its place in separating
operational capability from support roles. The following paragraphs will facilitate this
understanding.
"In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with its
citizens" (1:1). The Federal Government has long recognized the need to balance the
interests of national security with the need to operate in an efficient, businesslike manner.
To this end, and with varying degrees of success, it has made a distinction between the
functions it performs, which are inherently governmental, and those that are not. This
determination rests on a number of factors, including the level of Federal control

required, the nature of the function performed, statutory provisions, and the distinction
between oversight and recurring operations (2:3).
An inherently Governmental function is one that is "so intimately related to the
public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees" (1:2). Functions
that are determined not to be inherently governmental are candidates for outsourcing,
through private contract or Inter-Service Support Agreement (1SSA).

A-76 Process
Once an activity has been identified as non-inherently governmental, it becomes a
candidate for outsourcing to a commercial enterprise or another governmental
organization. A formal cost comparison is used to determine if it is more cost effective to
retain an activity in-house or to contract with a private entity or other government agency
through an Inter-service Support Agreement (1SSA). CIRCULAR NO. A-76 Revised
Supplemental Handbook governs conduct of the cost comparison. The process can be
divided into six major components (2:10).
Components of the A-76 Process
1. Development of a Performance Work Statement (P WS) and Quality
Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP)
2. Determine the Most Efficient Organization (MEO)
3. Determine the ln-House Cost Estimate
4. Develop a Request for Proposal (RFP) or Invitation for Bid (1FB)
5. Conduct the Cost Comparison
6. Administration of the Appeals Process
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The PWS specifically defines the work performed and output produced by a
Commercial Activity. It serves as the most basic means of comparison between
competing activities. The QASP identifies the measures of merit by which the MEO or
contract performance will be measured once awarded. The MEO is the organization that
will become the government competitor in any cost comparison. It represents the
governments best effort in meeting the requirements set forth in the PWS and capitalizes
on all possible efficiencies in order to be competitive with the private sector.
The 1HCE is summation of all MEO operating costs. It provides the basis for the
government bid in the Cost Comparison step. The mandatory costing software for DoD
Components is COMPARE (4:17). In the Request for Proposal (RFP) / Invitation for Bid
(IFB) step, the initiation of the actual solicitation for bids to commercial entities occurs.
Potential contractors use the PWS to develop their responses. These become the basis for
their bid during cost comparison.
Once both the in-house (MEO) bid and top contractor bit are available, they are
evaluated to determine the winning bid. COMPARE prepares the Cost Comparison
Form (CCF) used in making the cost comparison decision. It is important to point out
competing entities must beat the MEO bid by a minimum cost differential based on 10%
of the MEO direct labor cost or $10 Million (2:28).
Parties who want to challenge the cost comparison have the opportunity to appeal
the decision. Several criteria must be met before the Administrative Appeal Authority
will review the decision (5:55,58). In identifying these exempt activities, the Federal
government is able to adhere to the following stated policies: Achieve Economy and
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Enhance Productivity, Retain Government Functions In-House, and Rely on the
Commercial Sector (1:2).

Direct Conversion
Direct Conversion is simply a streamlined method to allow conversion of
workload to in-house, contract, or Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA), without
conduct of a cost comparison. Conditions for use of Direct Conversion require that only
activities with fewer than 10 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees be eligible and that all
offerors are able to provide required levels of service quality at fair and reasonable prices
(2:4).

Chapter Summary
In the preceding sections we developed a knowledge base to draw upon during the
conduct of further research. These sections are relevant because they build the
framework with which to begin evaluation of cost factors that were developed in
Ensuring a Level Playing Field and Considerations. We established a frame of reference
in Contextual Framework and provided a summary of regulatory guidance in the AFPD
38-6 section. Finally, applicable theory, definitions, and processes of each of the three
O&P mechanisms were provided. With this background, we will proceed with discussion
of the methodology used in the development of these studies.
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III.

Methodology

Introduction
This chapter focuses on the methodology that will be used to measure the validity
of conclusions drawn from accomplished research. Chapter III starts by distinguishing
between qualitative and quantitative methods used to achieve validity. The Case
approach is the qualitative method followed in this thesis. The appropriateness of this
method is justified in following discussions. Chapter III then expands into explanation
and validation of the design process to be used. In this effort, individual cases will be
examined then cross-case conclusions will be drawn to meet demands of the research
questions stated in Chapter I.

A Case for Qualitative Methods

What is a Qualitative Method?
"The label qualitative methods has no precise meaning in any of the social
sciences. It is at best an umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which
seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not
the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world"
(15:9).
In beginning a chapter with this statement, there is an implication that qualitative
research methods must be defended in order to gain support of the research. In
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Qualitative Methodology, editor John Van Maanen supports this claim. Maanen
postulates, "since quantitative methods have held an almost monopolistic grip on the
production of knowledge in the field, any serious reflection regarding current theory must
at some point consider the value of alternative methods" (15:11). He further asserts,
"there is a growing concern about where quantitative techniques are carrying us" (15:11).
In this, he implies that quantitative research procedures have become so "ritualized" that
there is a disconnect between what is being measured and the concept under study
(15:11).
Mintzberg, in an essay titled An Emerging Strategy of "Direct" Research,
provides additional support for the claims of Van Maanen. He states, "Too many of the
results have been significant only in the statistical sense of the word. In our work, we
have always found that simpler, more direct methodologies have yielded more useful
results" (15:107).

Designing a Research Strategy
Many different research strategy options exist for a research effort. Robert Yin
lists five specific types for consideration (6:6 - Figure 1.1). These include: the
experiment, a survey, an analysis of archival material, a study of historical material, and a
case study. Each can be evaluated for their proper relevance based on the research
objective. When choosing a strategy, the researcher must identify the form of question
being pursued. "In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why'
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when
the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (6:1)."
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Methodology
Having supported the validity of the case study, this methodology has been
selected it as a reasonable approach to provide support for the research questions posed
earlier in Chapter I. With this determination comes a series of further questions that must
be answered in order to define the specifics of the design process.
Design Construct
There are many different designs that must be considered before deciding on a
particular one. Each is suitable for different situations. There are single and multiple
cases as well as Holistic and Embedded designs. Yin summarizes these relationships in
the following table (6:39).
Table 1 - Basic Design Types
Single-case
designs

Multiplecase
designs

Holistic
(single unit of
analysis)

TYPE1

TYPE 3

Embedded
(multiple
units of
analysis)

TYPE 2

TYPE 4

The distinction between single-case and multiple-case design (columns) simply
delineates how many cases are going to be used to address the research questions (6:39).
The row headings "holistic" vs. "embedded" distinguish between single and multiple
units of analysis within a case (6:41).
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Multiple-Case - Embedded Design
For this research, the Multiple-Case - Embedded design is the most suitable. It
allows for the comparison of three separate cases to ascertain the thesis objectives. A
single case would allow no basis for comparison and the global nature of a holistic design
does not lend itself to the low-level examination of cost factors that must be
accomplished. The primary advantage of multiple case analysis is that the analysis is
considered more robust and the results more compelling than with a single case effort
(6:45).
In conducting a multiple case analysis, replication, rather than statistical
sampling, is of importance. The distinction is in the logic behind replication of an event
rather than the logic prescribed to statistical sampling. If, in the course of an experiment
a prediction is made and then bears true in multiple cases, replication is evident (6:45).
Sampling logic involves the theory whereby outcomes of the entire pool of cases can be
predicted through the representation of a few cases.
An item of concern in this study is the lack of suitable cases to examine in order
to show literal replication. In a literal replication, identification of similar results in each
case is the goal. In this study, the concept of theoretical replication will be used instead.
The two depot cases represent 40% of the USAF depot base (2 of 5). Addition of the
baseline case - the COMPARE model, provides an excellent yardstick since all A-76
studies (baring rule changes) have been, or will be, completed using its construct.
Examination of these three cases provides a sufficient base to identify contrasts between
them. Furthermore, the reasons for the different cost factors in each should be explicable
and therefore predictable. This is theoretical replication as defined by Yin (6:46).
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Summary of Design Process
In observance of the aforementioned criteria for developing a case study, the
following model will serve as the basis for conducting the case study analyses necessary
for this thesis. In brief, each case will be developed separately, and then the cross-case
conclusions will be drawn. A final report will then provide the cross-case conclusions.

Conduct

Write

1st case

individual

study

case report

Conduct

Wite

r+

Draw cross-case
conclusions

Select cases

w
Develop
Theory

*►

2xJcase

individual

study

case report

Mxffy theory

Design data
collection
protocol
Conduct

Write

remaining
case
studies

individual
case report

Note: Dotted lines indicate
discretionary process flow.

Develop policy
implications

Write cross-case
report

Figure 2 - Basic Design Types
Theory Development
In this report, the research questions posed in Chapter 1 serve as the guiding
influence. Here, the research objective is to provide defendable responses to each
question rather than prove or disprove a hypothesis and associated theory.
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Case Selection
Three cases have been identified for this study. The COMPARE model (Case 1)
serves as a baseline for cost factor comparison. It is highly standardized and represents a
stable platform with which to evaluate the similarities and differences of cost factors
found in the remaining two cases. All competitions using standard A-76 procedures can
be represented by this model.
Cases 2 and 3 were selected as representative of having relatively extreme
examples of cost factors that might be encountered during Public-Private competition. It
is important to mention that these cases had the significant benefit of complete and
accessible data with which to evaluate. The C-5 Business Area Competition, held at the
San Antonio Air Logistic Center (SA-ALC), Kelly AFB, Texas comprises Case II. Case
III is from the Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SM-ALC), McClellan AFB, California,
Workload Competition.
Data Collection Protocol
Case I will serve as the base line in development of data collection procedures.
The COMPARE software and associated regulatory guidance will be examined to
identify the core cost factors involved in completion evaluation. Each of the remaining
cases will be examined to reveal their critical cost factors. Rationale behind the different
factors and their relationships to the total evaluated cost of the bid will be evaluated.
Case Conduct, Reporting, and Cross-Case Conclusions
Each case will be analyzed separately to identify the cost factors that are
associated with computation of the bids total evaluated cost. Individual reports will also
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be prepared for each. The cost factors identified in Cases II and III will then be analyzed
for commonalities and differences. Finally, each factor will be matched to its related
factor in the Case I benchmark. Unmatched cost factors will be highlighted and will
serve as the response to the third research question. A final cross-case report will serve
as the basis for answering the final research question.

Critical Aspects of Research
In any research design effort, there are several standards that must be met to
validate a study. Yin combines these into four critical aspects of any research design
effort (6:32-33). These include:
1. Construct Validity
2. Internal Validity
3. External Validity
4. Reliability
Each is a measure of the quality of the research being presented and serves to
strengthen the position of the study logic. A summary of these tests and associated
implementation tactics is provided by Yin (6:33 - Figure 2.3).
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Table 2 - Case Study Tactics
Tests

Construct validity

Internal Validity

External Validity

Case study tactic

Phase of research in
which tactic occurs

Use multiple sources of
evidence

Data collection

Establish chain of evidence

Data collection

Have key informants review
draft case study report

Composition

Do pattern-matching

Data analysis

Do explanation-matching

Data analysis

Do time-series analysis

Data analysis

Use replication logic in
multiple-case studies

Research design

Use case study protocol

Data collection

Develop case study data base

Data collection

Reliability

Construct Validity
The concept of construct validity refers to the establishment of operational
measures for study topics (6:32). Construct validity involves ensuring that there are
multiple sources of proof for the data being used. In this study, the data used for Case I is
supported by regulatory guidance that is widely available in the public domain. Data for
Cases II and III carry slightly less weight than that of Case I due to the lack of formal
procedures for record keeping but is augmented by the existence of the Cost
Comparability Handbook (26) as a standard reference. The validity of the source
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documents for these cases also comes from the numerous collaborating documents and
briefings where the figures were presented.
Internal Validity
Internal validity refers to the establishment of causal relationships in a study.
Pattern-matching, explanation-matching, and time-series analysis are the tools for
ensuring internal validity. These are used in explanatory or causal studies and are not
applicable to this effort (6:32).
External Validity
External validity is achieved through replication logic in multiple case studies. It
refers to the parameters where research results can be generalized. Case 1 is an example
where absolute replication is possible. Procedures are highly standardized and results are
predictable. The limited number of cases to draw upon serves as a barrier for establishing
external validity in the two depot cases. Even so, it is reasonable to conclude that
similarities in cost factors between Cases II and III would allow a comfortable degree of
predictability in the event any of the remaining air force depots were targeted for an O&P
effort. Both depots were structured similarly and were subject to the same regulatory
guidance in performance of activities. Environmental or geographical differences that
separate the two depots are factors that can be predicted. It is important to remember that
the thrust of this research is to identify the differences between the depot competitions
and the baseline COMPARE model.
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Reliability
Reliability is the property that will allow others to repeat the work contained in a
research effort. Reliability is achieved through consistent application of case study
protocol. In this study, the protocol followed is the Multiple-Case - Embedded Design
discussed earlier in the chapter. Each case will be conducted according to the model
provided in Figure 2.

Chapter Summary
The appropriateness of the case methodology, and associated design process, used
in this research effort should now be established. The design process and adherence to
the standards established for validity (construct, internal, and external) and reliability
should provide confidence in the conclusions that will be identified in subsequent
sections.
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IV.

Data Analysis

Overview
In accordance with the methodology described in Chapter III, the three target case
studies are now presented. Case I will serve as the baseline for review of cases II and III.
Each case analysis will consist of an overview, followed by cost factor identification and
description. Upon completion of the individual cases, cross-case conclusions will be
drawn. Before analyzing individual cases, a review of source selection activities will be
presented to refine the context of the individual cost factors that are the focus of this
effort.

Source Selection Activities
To conduct a comparison of A-76 and Public-Private competitions, it is helpful to
first break down the source selection process into its most basic units. These are: PreSolicitation Activities, Evaluation Activities, and Award Activities. In order to show the
proper context of cost factors within the source selection process, a side-by-side
comparison model is also provided.
Pre-Solicitation Activities
Prior to an Outsourcing and Privatization initiative, there are several presolicitation activities that take place. For the A-76 competition, a commercial activities
inventory starts the process. A commercial activities inventory is a formal list submitted
to the Office of Management and Budget (by agency) detailing all commercial activities
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performed by in-house employees. The inventory serves as the basis for identification of
candidates for O&P initiatives. For Public-Private competitions, acquisition strategy
planning is the genesis of an O&P initiative. Acquisition strategy planning begins with
the identification of an unfulfilled requirement, mission need, or a planned/directed
change in business practice.
Next, each process conducts planning to outline the scope of the O&P activity
under consideration. In the A-76 process, a performance work statement (discussed in
Chapter II) is created, while in the Public-Private competition, source selection planning
is accomplished. Source selection planning includes identification of relevant factors and
associated levels of relative importance, schedule projections, and demonstrated
traceability between program risk and performance thresholds.
Finally, each process results in either a Request for Proposal (RFP) or an
Invitation for Bid (IFB). The RFP and 1FB provide prospective suppliers the basis upon
which to build a realistic and reasonable proposal. Basis for Award and Evaluation
Criteria and other evaluation factors (past performance, mission capability, risk, and
cost/price) are included.
Evaluation Activities
Each type of O&P initiative involves an evaluation process, which allows for
comparison of cost factors. It is in this step that the primary thrust for this research effort
resides. In the A-76 process, the final comparison is made between one public bidder and
a single private bid. The private bid has been identified as the lowest cost, responsive bid
from all private entrants (down selected). In the Public-Private process, the government
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bid is evaluated against all responsive and reasonable public bids to determine the best
value.
Evaluation also involves activities that are designed to level the playing field
among interested parties. Two of these elements include a Technical Evaluation and a
Risk Analysis. A technical analysis evaluates the bidders ability to meet objective and
performance requirements. Focus of this evaluation is on the strengths and inadequacies
of an offerors proposal (23:2). Risk Assessments are conducted to identify risk
associated with scheduling, proposal approach, and past performance (23:3-4). The A-76
process relies upon previously discussed assumptions of competition (Chapter 2) to
minimize risk while the Public-Private competition relies on several formal studies to
determine appropriate levels and types of risk.
Award Activities
Award Activities in each process involve several key steps. There is a decision
briefing, comprised of pertinent information and criteria, to aid the source selection
authority in making an award decision. Considerable effort is also expended in
documenting the evaluation and analysis of entrants. Finally, open and frank
communication, in the form of debriefings, is encouraged with entrants.
Outsourcing and Privatization Activities Comparison Model
The following diagram depicts these O&P activities. The model is not presented
as all-inclusive, but provides a general understanding of each process, inception to
implementation, and allows comparison of the different levels or activities involved in
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each. A general understanding of the Pre-selection and Award Activities helps put into
context the thrust of this thesis.

Step

1

A-76

Public-Private

Pre Solicitation Activities

<

f
2

Evaluation Activities
Level Playing Field
Cost Factor 1

Cost Factor n
Technical Analysis
Risk Analysis

\
3

Award Activities

Figure 3 - Outsourcing and Privatization Activities Comparison Model
Case I - Cost Factors for A-76 (COMPARE)

Case Overview
The purpose of this case is to establish an evaluation benchmark for Cases II and
III as well as to answer the first research question posed in Chapter I: "What are the
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baseline cost comparison factors established in COMPARE?" Information contained in
this analysis is drawn from the COMPARE software as well as the A-76 Costing Manual
(4). The cost factors identified should be considered applicable to any A-76 action since
COMPARE is the only authorized cost model.
Cost Factor Identification
The factors involved in calculation of the in-house (public) bid form the basis for
comparison with the private bids received. The public bid must include all applicable
factors in its submission. In the model, specific line items from private bids are entered
into COMPARE to allow comparison to the public bid and identification of the lowest
bidder. The following 18 categories represent the top-level factors included in
COMPARE. Each is broken down into its subcomponents where appropriate. It is
important to note that COMPARE leaves latitude for custom factors in many of the
categories.
•

Personnel Costs. Personnel Costs include the cost of all direct in-house labor and
supervision. Work tied to quality control, administration, and inspection of any
support contracts involved, is also included. Fringe benefits, overseas allowances and
other entitlements also comprise this list. Care must be taken to ensure the proper
inflation factors are used over the performance period (4:23-44).

•

Materials and Supply Costs. Raw materials, parts, subassemblies, components and
offices supplies are included in this figure. Only those costs directly attributable to
performance of the MEO may be included. If an item will be provided as
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) it should not be included as a cost to the
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MEO since it is then neutral as far as competition is concerned. In preparation of
MEO material and supply costs, care should be taken to ensure that any previously
shared expenses are properly prorated (4:45-49).
•

Depreciation. Depreciation represents the cost of ownership and the consumption of
an asset's useful life. In the A-76 process, only those items with an acquisition cost
of greater than $5,000 are depreciated. The costs of shared items are prorated to the
MEO based on the estimated percentage of use. The depreciable base used for cost
calculations is based on the asset's acquisition cost (including transportation and
installation) plus the cost of capital improvements less its disposal/residual value.
Useful life can be determined by the factors in Appendix 8 of the A-76 Costing
Manual or by local engineering estimates (4:50).

•

Cost of Capital. Cost of capital is an assigned charge on the Government's
investment in capital assets used in providing the product or service of the MEO. As
with depreciation, this charge applies to assets valued at $5,000 or greater.
Assignment of this charge is necessary only when the MEO acquired an asset within
two years prior to the cost comparison date or is a planned acquisition during the
performance period. The basis of computation is the same cost basis used for
depreciation multiplied by rates found in Appendix 5 of the Cost Manual. If the asset
is shared, the previous product is multiplied by the appropriate percent of usage
(4:54).

•

Rent. Rent includes any costs incurred for the use of land, buildings, space,
machinery or capability by the MEO. Vehicles and equipment rentals are most
common for the MEO. If the government is providing facilities or land to all bidders
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(i.e. GFE), associated rental costs are not included in the cost comparison. Prorating
expenses among shared rental items is expected (4:60).
•

Maintenance and Repair. This cost is incurred to keep buildings and equipment in
normal operating condition. The cost of capital improvements is not included (4:60).

•

Utilities. Any charges for telephone, electricity, water, waste management, etc. are
included in this cost factor. Costs are allocated or metered as appropriate to capture
applicable charges and adjustments should be made for anticipated changes to
expenses. The government has typically found it more cost efficient to furnish
utilities were possible (4:61).

•

Insurance. Insurance provides protection from risks and associated costs from any
potential property loss or liability claims that might arise during the conduct of an
activity. The government is self insured, while a private bidder must acquire
insurance at additional expense. To level the field, the government calculates
equivalent costs for its assets and personnel. If the government furnishes equipment,
the associated insurance need not be calculated unless specifically assigned in the
solicitation (4:62).

•

Travel. Travel expenses incurred as part of developing the P WS or generated in
developing and operating the MEO must be included in the cost comparison
evaluation. Costs for travel can be easily calculated from budgeted amounts of the
commercial activity under review or by MEO estimate (4:63).

•

MEO Subcontracts. The cost, to the MEO, of any subcontracts must be included in
the evaluation. Additionally, COMPARE computes an appropriate deduction for
Federal income taxes. This offsets potential revenue to the government from income
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taxes. Costs are not limited to those services acquired through subcontracts. Costs
incurred for services purchased by a Government purchase card (e.g. International
Merchant Purchase Authorization Card - IMPAC) must also be included (4:64).
•

Other Costs. COMPARE makes provisions for inclusion of any other cost factors
that are pertinent to the cost comparison. "Other costs" should include the cost of
items that are valued at less than $5,000 and are not immediately consumed by the
MEO. Office furniture, projectors, and tools fall into this category (4:65).

•

Overhead Costs. The MEO is automatically charged an overhead rate of 12% of the
personnel costs discussed earlier. This charge is used to allocate overhead costs that
are not necessarily visible to the commercial activity. A lack of specific overhead
costs is due to a lack of a viable cost accounting system such as Activity Based
Costing (ABC). Waivers to this policy are permitted if an agency can produce
credible evidence that a different rate is appropriate. The charge of an appropriate
overhead rate is of major importance to both public and private competitors. The
public bidder does not want to be unnecessarily burdened with a rate that overstates
true costs, nor does it want to be held hostage to government constraints against the
liquidation of assets that it is subject to. The private bidder seeks to ensure that the
public bidder does not realize an unfair advantage because its overhead costs are
buried in part of a larger, unrelated, organization. Failure to include overhead costs
would significantly lower the cost of the MEO (4:68).

•

Additional Costs. This category allows for cost factors that are not otherwise
properly classified in previous sections. Items such as transition expenses,
conversion costs, and office/plant rearrangements are included in this line item. Any
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new requirements, resulting from creation of the MEO, should be included here
(4:70).
•

Contract Administration Costs. The costs discussed to this point have been added to
the cost of the MEO. Contract administration costs are added to the cost of the
private bidder or ISS A contestant. The purpose of this category is to account for the
additional cost of contract inspection, quality assurance evaluations and other
administrative expenses that are new to the government as a result of a private entity
being awarded the bid (4:75).

•

One-Time Conversion Costs. Any conversion, whether public to private or private to
public, involves one-time costs related to that conversion. COMPARE recognizes the
following three categories: Labor, Material, and "Other" one-time conversion costs.
Labor costs include severance pay, retraining costs and relocation expenses. Costs
included in the material category are those such as the conduct of a joint inventory
and the associated cost of transfer of ownership or responsibility. The last category is
open to allow inclusion of costs such as accomplishing new background checks and
security clearances (4:80).

•

Gain on Assets. In developing an MEO, an agency may identify capital assets that
are now excess to requirements. The cost of disposal or transfer is assets is based on
a decision of economic advantage to the taxpayer. If the cost of transfer of disposal
exceeds the book value of the asset, the losses are not assessed against the
private/ISSA offer. Only items that are deemed excess, but not made available to the
private/ISSA bidder are assessed this charge (4:84).
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•

Federal Income Tax Deduction. Award of a contract provides a source of revenue
that is subject to Federal income tax. This tax reduces the Governments net cost of
contracting by generating revenue to the Government for the portion of the contract
price subject to Federal income taxes. Unless an offerer is a tax-exempt entity, this
deduction is made (4:87).

•

Minimum Conversion Differential. The minimum conversion differential represents
a compilation of intangible costs that is applied to the incumbent service provider.
The differential is the lesser of 10 percent of personnel costs or $10 million over all
the contract performance periods in the solicitation. This minimum was established
to protect the government from conversions where there are only marginal estimated
savings. Examples of the factors considered in the differential are things such as
morale, disruption, and other factors not specifically included in the in-house estimate
(4:89).

Case II - C-5 Business Area Competition, SA-ALC

Case Overview
This case represents the first of two Public-Private competitions that will be
examined. This case centers on the C-5 Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) and
Speedline programs, performed by the C-5 Business Area, at the San Antonio Air
Logistics Center (SA-ALC) at Kelly AFB, Texas. The Speedline program refers to the
Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) activities conducted to ensure readiness of
the C-5 aircraft (24:3). The competition is a result of a June 1995 Base Realignment and
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Closure Commission (BRAC) decision to determine where future workload would be
performed (24:2).
Cost Factor Identification
Three primary criteria were established to allow evaluation and comparison of the
costs of bids received. These were completeness, realism, and reasonableness.
Completeness of bids was evaluated by assessing the level of detail the offerer provided
in cost information required by the RFP (25:6). Realism was evaluated by assessing the
compatibility of proposal costs with proposal scope and effort (25:6). The
reasonableness of a bid consisted of evaluating a bid through cost or price analysis
techniques (25:6). The Reasonableness Analysis establishes the starting point for our
analysis of cost factors in this case.
The following table identifies the factors used for evaluation of the C-5
competition. The factors are grouped into four categories: Recurring Customer Costs,
Comparability Adjustments, Department of Defense (DoD) Adjustments, and Strengths,
Weaknesses, and Risk. Recurring Customer Costs indicate those items that can readily
be compared across competing organizations over the life of the contract. Comparability
Adjustments refer to those items that are necessary to make costs between different
Services or public entities comparable (26:11). DoD Adjustment factors represent overall
costs or savings to the DoD that must be considered over the life of the contract. The
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk category highlights cost factors that are designed to
capture a dollar equivalent of historically intangible benefits and risks that arise in
conduct of assessing and quantifying the strengths, weaknesses, and risk associated with
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an offeror. Examples include assessments from the Performance Risk Assessment Group
(PRAG) or technical risk assessments from the Source Selection Evaluation Board
(SSEB) Technical Team. This process will be referred to as "dollarization (24:42)" in the
remainder of this document. Note that the Warner Robins bid served as the public offer
rather than the incumbent SA-ALC (due to BRAC decision).

Table 3 - Case II Cost Factors
Warner Robins

McDonnell Douglas

Lockheed Martin

Cost Element

Cost Element

Cost Element

Direct Labor
Direct Material
Other Direct
Production OH
G&A
C-5 Overhead Rate Adjust

Recurring Customer Costs
Direct Labor
Direct Material
Other Direct
Production OH
G&A
Profit

Direct Labor
Direct Material
Other Direct
Production OH
G&A
Profit

Comparability Adjustments
State Unemployment Payments
Unfunded Civilian Retirement
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities
Casualty Insurance
Military Non-Depot Costs
Other Recurring Costs
Other Nonrecurring Costs

Contract Administration
Overhead Costs
Overhead Savings
RIF Costs
BEQAVIP Adjustment
Govt. Transition (Personnel)

Department of Defense Adjustments
Contract Administration
Federal Income Tax
Overhead Costs
RIF Costs
Award Fee
BEQAVIP Adjustment
Cost of Facilities Capital
Govt. Transition (Personnel)

Contract Administration
Federal Income Tax
Overhead Costs
RIF Costs
Award Fee
BEQAVIP Adjustment
Cost of Facilities Capital
Govt. Transition (Personnel)

Streright. Weaknesses, and Risk
Flowdays
Paint Facility

Flowdays
WIP Warranty

Recurring Customer Costs
Direct Labor is simply the cost of directly chargeable labor applicable to
performance of each bid (25:16,31,48; 26:16). Direct Material, expressed as a total
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project cost, is the amount of material that is directly attributable to the performance of
the bid by each party (25:16,31,48; 26:16). Each bidder also had costs categorized as
Other Direct. These costs represent items such as the cost of travel or purchased services
that cannot be attributed to other factors. (25:16,31,48; 26:16). Production Overhead
refers to the amount of overhead cost that is attributed to production (25:16,31,48; 26:16).
The costs included as General and Administrative are those remaining overhead costs that
are not associated with production, but are still indirectly attributable to performance of
the contract (25:16,31,48; 26:16). The final factor considered under Recurring Customer
Costs is Profit. Private entrants provide their expected profit while public entities provide
an adjustment to their overhead rates since they are at an advantage due to their nonprofit status (25:16,31,48).
Recurring Comparability Adjustments
•

State Unemployment Payments. This factor adjusts the public bid to include the cost
of payments that private entrants would have to pay for unemployment benefits. This
adjustment is necessary because unemployment payments are not part of the public
entrants previous labor costs (25:33; 26:17,A-3).

•

Unfunded Civilian Retirement. This represents an addition to the public entrants
expenses and negates the effects of DoD contributions the Civil Service Retirement
System. The adjustment is made to the public entrant when competing against private
entrants. No adjustment is necessary between two public entrants (25:33; 26:17,A3,A-35).
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•

Depreciation of Military Construction Program (MCP) Facilities. Construction of
depot facilities is accomplished with funds that are separate from the organizations
operating budget. To capture the benefit received by the public bidder, the
depreciated cost of facilities constructed with MCP funding is added to the public bid
(25:33; 26:17).

•

Casualty Insurance. This adjustment compensates for the estimated cost of casualty
insurance that a public organization would have to pay if operating without the
benefit of government self-insurance practices. This factor covers the replacement of
facilities and equipment due to casualty losses (25:33; 26:17, A-40).

•

Military Non-Depot Costs. Military non-depot costs are the quantified expenses of
military personnel assigned to the depot who spend time on non-depot related duties.
Examples are military training and parades. Only those military members that
support the contracted workload are included in this adjustment (25:34; 26:17, A-35).

•

Other Recurring Costs. The public organization must include costs that will be
incurred by the proposed alternative. In this case, the cost of test pilots were included
in the public entrants estimates, however these personnel were to be government
furnished to private entrants. For this reason a reduction in the public organizations
estimate was in order. Other factors included in this category are Impact Aid (the
amount of funds the Department of Education contributes to local public schools)
Retiree Health Benefits, and Base Operating and Support Costs (25:34; 26:17-18).

•

Other Nonrecurring Costs. Like the previous category, this adjustment is made to
identify costs that the public organization will incur during the course of performing
the proposed work. The difference is that this category captures only the one-time
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costs. An examination of Case II reveals that only the one-time labor cost of
reservists supporting work-in-process for the transition period need be adjusted
(25:34; 26:18).
Department of Defense Adjustments
•

Contract Administration. This factor captures the costs that the public offeror will
expend in performing routine administration of the contract. In this Case, it is the
cost of additional employees who will monitor and oversee the performance of the
contract (25:18,49; 26:23).

•

Federal Income Tax. Federal income taxes paid by private contractors reduce the true
cost to the taxpayer (25:18,49; 26:24). An adjustment is therefore necessary to level
the playing field. This adjustment is made only to the private offerers since the
public entity does not pay taxes and therefore does not cause a reduction in the cost of
a contract to the taxpayer. Calculations are subtracted from the private entities offer.

•

Overhead Costs. This factor captures the increased cost to overhead that will be
incurred to workloads remaining at Kelly AFB. The increased cost results from the
reduced base from which to "spread" overhead expenses of the remaining workload
(25:49,50).

•

Overhead Savings. This credit is applied to offerers to offset the decreased cost of
overhead rates that would be realized at Warner Robins AFB if the additional
workload from Kelly AFB were added. The new work would create an increased
base from which Warner Robins could spread existing overhead expenses (25:36).
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•

Reduction-In-Force Cost Estimate. The workload that will be contracted will no
longer remain at Kelly AFB. As a result, there were 1298 positions that were
identified for Reduction-ln-Force actions. Adjustments considered the cost of lump
sum leave, unemployment compensation, medical insurance, PCS costs, training,
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VS1P), and Voluntary Early Retirement (VERA)
(25:20,38,50). Had there been potential to place affected employees, this adjustment
would not have been necessary.

•

Award Fees. Adjustments were made to the private offerors annual contact proposal
price where the proposal included award fees or incentives. The adjusted amount was
computed by adding 65% of the annual maximum fee/incentive to the annual contract
proposal price (25:20,50).

•

BEQ Adjustment and Work-in-Process. This adjustment was necessary to adjust bid
differences resulting from different interpretations in the RFP. For the sake of
evaluation only, workload factors for BEQ and W1P were adjusted for all offerors
over the same period of time (25:21,40,51).

•

Cost of Facilities Capital. Unique arrangements for the disposal of property
associated with Kelly AFB made it necessary to adjust private bids downward to
compensate for the subsidy, in the form of interest free mortgages and deferred
payments, that they would receive. The majority of land, facilities, and equipment,
associated with Kelly AFB, were transferred to the Local Redevelopment Agency in
San Antonio. This loss of potential revenue and associated lease, below market
value, served to subsidize private bids (25:21,51).
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•

Government Transition Personnel. This factor was necessary to quantify the cost to
the Government of carrying Kelly AFB employees that were identified for RIF but
not rehired by the offerers. The period of adjustment began with the date of contract
award and continued through the RIF period. Calculations were made by month and
took normal attrition into consideration (25:22,40,52).

Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk
•

Flow Days. In both the Warner Robins and Lockheed Martin proposals, adjustments
were made to include the benefit of efforts to reduce the number of flow days below
RFP requirements. Dollarization calculations were based on information obtained
from the offerors technical proposals and from rates derived from Air Mobility
Command (AMC) Flying Hour programs (25:42).

•

Paint Facility. The SSEB Technical Team determined risk in the Warner Robins
proposal for flow of aircraft through the pain facility during the 2003/04 Fiscal Year
(FY). The dollarized addition to their bid accounted for a probable 20% increase in
direct labor costs during this time frame (25:42).

•

WIP Warranty. The final adjustment in the SA-ALC competition for risk was made
to the McDonnel Douglas (MD) offer. MD offered the benefit of a limited warranty
for Work In Progress accepted at transition. The dollarized value was calculated at
1% of their WIP proposal. The basis for the rate was obtained from similar
commercial warranties.
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Case III - Workload Competition, SM-ALC

Case Overview
This case represents the second of two Public-Private competitions that will be
examined. The focus of this case is the solicitation for the Depot Maintenance Workload
at the Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SM-ALC) performed at McClellan AFB,
California. The 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC)
directed the closure of McClellen AFB. Under DBCRC direction, a portion of the depot
maintenance workload was transferred to the United States Army. Remaining work was
to be reassigned after Public-Private competition. Workload involved programmed and
unprogrammed KC-135 and A-10 aircraft inspection, maintenance, modification, and
Analytical Condition Inspection, and overhaul and repair of Hydraulics,
Instruments/Electronics, and Electrical Accessories and non-routed
backshop/manufacturing support services (27:4).
As with Case II, specific criteria were established to allow evaluation and
comparison of the bids received. The overarching goal was to complete an integrated
assessment of Best Value. The primary criteria evaluated centered on Transition,
Operations, and Cost. Transition involved evaluation of an Integrated Master Plan, a
Personnel Plan, and an Integrated Master Schedule. The Operations factors included KC135 Aircraft, Hydraulics, Instruments/Electronics, Electrical Accessories, and A-10
Aircraft. Cost factors, the focus of this research, are evaluated in much greater detail in
the following paragraphs.
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Cost Factor Identification
The following table identifies the factors used for evaluation of the SM-ALC
competition. Like the factors identified in Case II, the factors in this case are grouped
into four categories: Recurring Customer Costs, Comparability Adjustments, Department
of Defense (DoD) Adjustments, and Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risks. Recurring
Customer Costs indicate those items that can readily be compared across competing
organizations over the life of the contract. Comparability Adjustments refer to those
items that are necessary to make costs between different Services or public entities
comparable (26:11). DoD Adjustment factors represent overall costs or savings to the
DoD that must be considered over the life of the contract. The Strengths, Weaknesses,
and Risk category highlights cost factors that are designed to capture a dollar equivalent
of historically intangible benefits and risks that arise in conduct of assessing and
quantifying the strengths, weaknesses, and risk associated with an offerer. Examples
include assessments from the Performance Risk Assessment Group (PRAG) or technical
risk assessments from the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) Technical Team.
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Table 4 - Case III Cost Factors
SM Baseline

OO-ALC

Lockheed Martin

Cost Element

Cost Element

Cost Element

Direct Labor
Direct Material
Other Direct
Production OH
G&A

Recurring Customer Costs
Direct Labor
Direct Material
Other Direct
Production OH
G&A

State Unemployment Payments
Unfunded Civilian Retirement
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities
Casualty Insurance
Military Non-Depot Costs
Other Recurring Costs

Comparability Adjustments
State Unemployment Payments
Unfunded Civilian Retirement
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities
Casualty Insurance
Military Non-Depot Costs
Other Recurring Costs

GFM

CRI/CSI

Department of Defense Adjustments
Contract Administration
Cost of Capital
Federal Income Tax
Award Fees
GFM
RIF Costs
Govt. Transition (WIP)
Govt. Transition (Personnel)
BOS Costs
CRI/CSI
Contract DMAG Surcharge

St re rights. Weaknesses and Risk
Transition Risk - Schedule/Efficiency
Steady State Risk
Productivity Risk

Direct Labor
Direct Material
Other Direct
Production OH
G&A
Profit

Contract Administration
Cost of Capital
Federal Income Tax
Award Fees
GFM
RIF Costs
Govt. Transition (WIP)
Govt. Transition (Personnel)
BOS Costs
CRI/CSI
Contract DMAG Surcharge
GFE Depreciation

Transition Risk - Labor
Transition Risk - Commodities

Recurring Customer Costs
Direct Labor is simply the cost of directly chargeable labor applicable to
performance of each bid (27:24, 61; 26:16). Direct Material expressed as a total project
cost, is the amount of material that is directly attributable to the performance of the bid
by each party (27:24, 61; 26:16). Each bidder also had costs categorized as Other Direct.
These costs represent items such as the cost of travel or purchased services that cannot be
attributed to other factors. (27:24, 61; 26:16). Production Overhead refers to the amount
of overhead cost that is attributed to production (27:26, 62; 26:16). The costs included as
General and Administrative are those remaining overhead costs that are not associated
with production, but are still indirectly attributable to performance of the contract (27:27,
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62; 26:16). The final factor considered under Recurring Customer Costs is Profit. The
private entrant, Lockheed Martin, was required to provide an estimation of their expected
profit (27:78).
Recurring Comparability Adjustments
•

State Unemployment Payments. State unemployment payments are the amount of
contribution the Department of Labor provides to a state's unemployment fund based
on employment fluctuations. This adjustment is necessary because unemployment
payments are not part of the public entrants previous labor costs (27:28; 26:17,A-3).

•

Unfunded Civilian Retirement. This represents an addition to the public entrants
expenses and negates the effects of DoD contributions the Civil Service Retirement
System. The adjustment equates to the amount of unfunded civilian retirement
liability the public offeror will incur based on the number of employees covered by
the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). The adjustment is made to the public
entrant when competing against private entrants. No adjustment is necessary between
two public entrants (27:28; 26:17,A-3,A-35).

•

Depreciation of Military Construction Program (MCP) Facilities. Construction of
depot facilities is accomplished with funds that are separate from the organizations
operating budget. To capture the benefit received by the public bidder, the
depreciated cost of facilities constructed with MCP funding is added to the public bid
(27:28; 26:17).

•

Casualty Insurance. This adjustment covers the risk for casualty losses and liability
claims the Government assumes because it is self-insured and must pay for each loss
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incurred. Private organizations are required to cover these risks, therefore the public
offer must be leveled (27:29; 26:17, A-40).
•

Military Non-Depot Costs. Military non-depot costs are the quantified expenses of
military personnel assigned to the depot who spend time on non-depot related duties.
Examples are military training and parades. Only those military members that
support the contracted workload are included in this adjustment (27:29; 26:17, A-35).

•

Other Recurring Costs. The public organization must include all costs that will be
incurred by the proposed alternative. Factors included in this category are Impact Aid
(the amount of funds the Department of Education contributes to local public schools)
Retiree Health Benefits, Mobilization Support, and Base Operating and Support Costs
(27:30-31; 26:17-18).

Department of Defense Adjustments
•

Contract Administration. This factor captures the costs that the public offeror will
expend in performing routine administration of the contract. In this Case, it is the
cost associated with DCMC oversight of the contract and the establishment of new
offices and expansion of existing offices to accommodate the competition workload
(27:41; 26:23).

•

Cost of Capital. This adjustment is typically applied only to private offerers and
represents the amount of income that would have been realized had capital
investments been invested in a different fashion. In this case, adjustments were also
made to a public offeror due to a teaming relationship with a private entity as part of
their bid (27:41, 63).
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•

Federal Income Tax. Federal income taxes paid by private contractors reduce the true
cost to the taxpayer (27:42, 63; 26:24). An adjustment is therefore necessary to level
the playing field. This adjustment is made only to the private offerors since the
public entity does not pay taxes and therefore does not cause a reduction in the cost of
a contract to the taxpayer. Calculations are subtracted from the private entities offer.

•

Award Fees. Adjustments were made to the private offerors annual contact proposal
price where the proposal included award fees or incentives. The adjusted amount was
computed by adding 65% of the annual maximum fee/incentive to the annual contract
proposal price (27:42, 64).

•

Government Furnished Material (GFM). This factor adjusts bids to compensate for
the cost of GFE (or material) provided by the RFP (27:42, 64).

•

Reduction-In-Force (RIF)ZTransfer Costs. This adjustment accounts for the cost of
transferring personnel to other government locations (i.e. OO-ALC) and the expense
of RIF's for those individuals, at SM-ALC, who do not transfer to other government
jobs (27:42, 64-65). Adjustments considered the cost of lump sum leave,
unemployment compensation, medical insurance, PCS costs, training, Voluntary
Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP), and Voluntary Early Retirement (VERA) (25:38).

•

Government Transition - Work-in-Process. This factor includes the cost of the
workload that must be accomplished by SM-ALC during the transition to the winning
bidder (27:43,65). Figures are based on projected WIP remaining until the contract
period begins.

•

Government Transition - Personnel. An adjustment is necessary for the SM-ALC
employees who are not placed into other jobs between the period of contract award
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and normal attrition. Considerations are made for personnel hired by other bidders,
used to complete the Government portion of the workload, retire, quit, or are loaned
(27:43, 65).
•

Base Operating Support (BOS) Costs. Adjustments for BOS are necessary to account
for expense to the government for ancillary services performed for general base-wide
services. Costs such as fire protection and security fall into this category (27:44, 65).

•

Assets Storage. These costs are for material storage, warehousing, issuing, receiving,
etc. over the contract period. Private offerers had to include the cost of services
provided by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), while the public offerer did not
due to existing availability of DLA support (27:44-45).

•

Contract Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG) Surcharge. This cost
represents a 1.5% surcharge expensed for Industrial Fund overhead charges. This
adjustment is applied to the cost of all non-BRAC workload accomplished by a
private contractor (27:45, 66).

Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk
•

Transition Risk - Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC). There were four areas of
risk identified with the transition of workload to the OO-ALC (27:45-47). The first
adjustment assumed that there would be a 45% drop in work force efficiency (worst
case) impacting projected workload (by OO-ALC partner Boeing) to be accomplished
by the remnant workforce at Sacramento. A second area of transition risk was
identified in the optimistic 90% efficiency projected by Boeing for new work at the
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old C-5 facility at Kelly AFB. This "new" workforce was estimated to begin at 75%
efficiency and climb to 85% by the end of the first year.
Additional risk was identified in the OO-ALC offer in its proposal to allow an
operating location at SA-ALC to complete a portion of Commodities W1P. Where 80%
efficiency was proposed, the cost team determined a 65% rate was more appropriate to
account for a worst case scenario. Finally, the OO-ALC bid was adjusted to account for a
worst-case efficiency of 65% during year one of operations at OO-ALC (27:47).
•

Transition Risk: Labor - Lockheed Martin (LM). Like the OO-ALC proposal,
Lockheed Martin proposed leaving a portion of workload behind at Sacramento.
Experience with the San Antonio Depot Competition (Case II) showed that
efficiencies were overstated during the transition year and therefore an efficiency rate
of 65% was more appropriate than the proposed 80% rate. The LM bid was also
adjusted to account for the likelihood that its 90% projected efficiencies were
unrealistic. The cost team used a rate of 80%, rising to 87%, for this adjustment
(27:66).

•

Transition Risk: Commodities - LM. The cost team used similar methodology to
account for Commodities transition risk. The commodities W1P to be accomplished
at Sacramento was proposed to be 80%. The cost team adjusted this to 65% to
account for the likelihood of additional risk. The 90% efficiency proposed by LM for
direct labor was also adjusted to reflect a more realistic 85% initial rate, which would
rise to 87% over the initial contract year (27:67).

•

Production Risk - OOALC. This factor was created to "quantify risk from the OOALC technical proposal and the risk associated with their ability to estimate future
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costs (27:47)." The proposal identified a large reduction (over time) in commodity
hours. The basis for this reduction was identified as process improvements and
reengineered hours to complete work. The cost team accepted that a reduction of
10% was achievable but reductions beyond that were to be considered as risk. The
resulting adjustment quantified the number of hours that exceeded the 10% rate
(27:47,48).
•

Steady State Risk - OO-ALC. The risk identified in this factor represents the benefit
received by a public offeror (here OO-ALC) as a result of full coverage, by the DOD,
of net losses in Working Capital Funds (WCFs). This added funding capacity gives
the public offeror a significant economic advantage over a private offeror. To adjust
for this benefit, the OO-ALC bid was increased. The nature of this adjustment was
such that a risk range was deemed more appropriate than a single estimate. This
range was added to the other risk factors (Transition and Production to produce a
Total Risk Range (27:49) with which to base decisions.

Cross Case Comparison

Overview
The purpose of the following analysis is to summarize the results from the three
cases and identify similar and disparate cost factors. In analyzing the three cases, it
became immediately apparent that the structure used in the depot comparison, based on
the Cost Comparability Handbook (26), was more concise, easier to understand, and
more conducive to a thorough cost comparison. The baseline case, using COMPARE
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and the A-76 Costing Manual (4) as its guiding reference, while containing more specific
factors, tended to lend confusion. The primary source of confusion was that it is difficult
to distinguish between factor categories, many with similar labels. Secondly, the more
extensive use of "fixed" factors, where the user is asked to simply fill in the blanks, tends
to limit comparison to only those factors, even though some provision is made to allow
the inclusion of others.
The format for the cross-case comparison will be to use the more extensive list of
factors in Case 1 as the means of comparison. Factors from Cases II and III will then be
matched, by definition, to those baseline factors. Unmatched factors will then be subject
to further explanation. Table 5, below, is a compilation of the many factors identified in
the analysis of individual cases. This serves as the starting point for the matching of
factors, which follows.
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Table 5 - Cross-Case Comparison: Initial
A-76
Personnel Costs
Salaries
Wages
Other Entitlements
Fringe Benefits
Other Pay
Overseas Allowances

SA-ALC
Recurring Customer Costs
Direct Labor
Direct Material
Other Direct
Production OH
G&A
Profit

SM-ALC
Recurring Customer Costs
Direct Labor
Direct Material
Other Direct
Production OH
G&A
Profit

Material and Supply Costs
Other Specifically Attributable Costs
Depreciation
Cost of Capital
Rent
Maintenance and Repair
Utilities
Insurance
Travel
Subcontracts
Other Costs
Overhead Costs
Additional Costs
Current to MEO Transition Costs
Plant Rearrangements
Training
Recruitment

Comparability Adjustments
State Unemployment Payments
Unfunded Civilian Retirement
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities
Casualty Insurance
Military Non-Depot Costs
Other Recurring Costs
Other Nonrecurring Costs
DoD Adjustments
Contract Administration
Federal Income Tax
Award Fee
Cost of Facilities Capital

Additional Costs

Other Recurring Costs

DoD Adjustiments
Contract Administration
Federal Income Tax
Award Fees
Cost of Capital

RIF Costs
Govt. Transition (Personnel)
BEQ/WIP Adjustment

RIF Costs
Govt. Transition (Personnel)
Govt. Transition (WIP)

Overhead Costs
Overhead Savings

Government Furnished Material
BOS Costs
CRI/CSI
Contract DMAG Surcharge

Contract Administration Costs
Compliance Review
Payment Processing
Negotiating Change Orders
Contract Closeout Expenses

Comparability Adjustiments
State Unemployment Payments
Unfunded Civilian Retirement
Depreciateion of MCP Facilities
Casualty Insurance
Military Non-Depot Costs

GFE Depreciation
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk
Flowdays
Paint Facilities
WIP Warranty

One-Time Conversion Costs
Retraining Costs

Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk
Transition Risk - Schedule/Efficiency
Steady State Risk
Production Risk
Trasition Risk - Commodities
Trasiton Risk - Labor

Relocation Costs
Cost of Joint Inventory
Security Clearances
Separation Incentives
Gain on Assets
Federal Income Taxes
Minimum Conversion Differential
Phase-In Period Costs

Factor Comparison
For clarity, the following convention will be used to differentiate between the
individual cost factors and cost categories being compared. Individual cost factors will
be italicized while the baseline/COMPARE cost categories, serving as the organizational
basis for the following paragraphs, will be underlined.
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•

Personnel Costs. The first category COMPARE identifies is Personnel Costs.
Included factors are Salaries, Wages, Other Entitlements, Fringe Benefits, Other Pay,
and Overseas Allowances. This ties directly with the Direct Labor factor found under
the Recurring Customer Costs category used in both depot competitions.

•

Material and Supply Costs. The second category used in the baseline model is
Material and Supply Costs. This category represents a one-for-one match with the
definitional intent of the Direct Material factor found in the Depot cases.

•

Other Specifically Attributable Costs is the next category identified by COMPARE.
Depreciation under COMPARE has a direct match with Depreciation ofMCP
Facilities in Cases II and III. Cost of Capital and Cost ofFacilities Capital also form
a direct match between the baseline and depots. The Recurring Customer Cost factor,
Other Direct, in the Depot Cases is broken down into great detail in the COMPARE
model. Encompassed in this single category are Rent, Maintenance and Repair,
Utilities, Travel, Subcontracts, and Other Costs. Another factor in this category is
Insurance, which has its depot complement, Casualty Insurance, under the
Comparability Adjustments depot category. The SM-ALC depot competition adds a
factor that can be included in this category. CRI/CSI Assets Storage is simply the
warehouse and packaging expenses that must be included.

•

Overhead Costs. In the COMPARE model, this factor represents 12% of the Civilian
Personnel Costs identified previously (4:68). This factor, or a calculated and
approved substitute, compare with the Production OH category in the depots. Both
are essentially indirect production expenses. The G&A factor and the BOS Costs
factor from the depots are also identifiable with this category.
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•

Additional Costs. This factor is a sort of catchall for factors not yet captured. The
focus of the COMPARE model focuses on those costs that result from "unusual" or
"special" circumstances (4:70). Specifically listed are Current to MEO Transition
Costs, Plant Rearrangements, Training, and Recruitment. Review of the criteria for
factors in the depot cases, these adjustments can be matched to the Comparability
Adjustment factors of Other Recurring Costs and Other Nonrecurring Costs. While
the Cost Comparability Handbook (CCH) (26), does not specifically address these
COMPARE factors, the flexibility to include them remains.

•

Contract Administration Costs. This category of factors, including Compliance
Review, Payment Processing, Negotiating Change Orders, and Contract Closeout
Expenses, has a direct match in the CCH and in the depot comparisons. Contract
Administration, under Department of Defense Adjustments, is clearly a match.

•

Additional Costs. This Category/Factor found in COMPARE contains identical
wording to the previous category of the same name. The only discernable difference
is the designation that this category be used to adjust for costs incurred by a contract
or 1SSA offeror but not incurred by the MEO (4:79). As stated previously, this
category can be matched with the factors identified as Other Recurring Costs and
Other Nonrecurring Costs in the depot cases.

•

One-Time Conversion Costs. Factors such as Retraining, Relocation, Joint Inventory,
Security Clearances, and Separation Incentives are identified in COMPARE as OneTime Conversion Costs. The government uses a 4% severance factor to cover all
costs associated with the involuntary separation of civilian employees. Equivalent
Public-Private competition factors are RTF Costs and Government Transition for
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Personnel costs. The major difference between models is the use of a standard rate,
in the COMPARE model, versus a calculated amount in the Public-Private
competition. A case can be made that the Public-Private factors of State
Unemployment Payments and Unfunded Civilian Retirement are also included in the
4% flat rate used in A-76. Other factors mated to this category are the cost of
BEQ/WIP and Government Transition (WIP). Though not specifically addressed,
they meet the intent of this COMPARE Adjustment.
•

Gain on Assets. COMPARE identifies this factor separately from the Cost of Capital
category previously discussed. It differentiates itself by identifying as valid, only
those costs of capital assets that will be used by the MEO but not made available to
the contract/lSSA. The Public-Private competition and the CCH treat these costs as
Costs ofFacilities Capital when adjusting the MEO figures.

•

Federal Income Taxes. Both A-76 and Public-Private competitions make provisions
for adjustment of bids for potential Federal Income Tax revenue. As stated
previously, this adjustment accounts for the tax revenue generated by private
contractors. This effect reduces the cost of a contract to the taxpayer and must be
made equitable to private offerers.

•

Phase-in Period Costs. The CCH and depot competitions handle Phase-in Period
Costs under Comparability Adjustments category. Specifically, these costs are
included as Other Nonrecurring Costs.
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Unmatched Factors
The following factors are those that remain after logically matching all identified
cost factors, found in the baseline case, with all cost factors utilized in the Public-Private
depot competitions. When specific guidance, in the A-76 Costing Manual, was not
available to directly link factors, a judgment call was made as to a factors proper
inclusion. The basis for judgment was built on the perceived intent of the baseline
category or factor. Intent was determined through review and interpretation of the
available definitional guidance.
•

Minimum Conversion Differential. This category/factor has no equal in the PublicPrivate competition list of cost factors. The merit of this factor rests in its goal to
instill a degree of risk reduction for some of the intangible factors associated with a
competition. Eggers (Chapter II) highlighted this type of cost factor as a significant
barrier to entry for private bidders. The private bidder must, above all things, turn a
profit. To win an A-76 competition, a 10% differential must be overcome, even
before a private offeror can be considered competitive. Only then can profit be
considered.

•

Profit. This factor, seen in the depot competitions, has no unique equivalent in the
COMPARE model. In the depots, profit was added to the cost of private offerers to
clearly identify the total customer cost. COMPARE does not break this factor out
explicitly; it is simply part of the aggregate of the winning private offerers bid.
COMPARE simply selects the lowest cost after adjustments as the winning bid.

•

Military Non-Depot Costs. This depot factor adjusts for the quantified expenses of
military personnel assigned to the depot who spend time on non-depot related duties.
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The adjustment correctly considers military workload that will still have to be
accomplished, at expense to the government, when military positions are eliminated.
•

Award Fee. This factor is included in depot competitions to account for the high
likelihood of awards or incentives being paid to contactors. A flat 65% is added to
the proposed maximum annual award fee/incentive specified in the contract in
anticipation of the award/incentive being earned.

•

Overhead Costs and Savings. This adjustment is unique to the depot competitions
and accounts for the increased costs, at the affected depot, as overhead rates for
remaining workload have to be spread across fewer organizations. It also adjusts for
the decreased cost of overhead at a public organization, which might obtain workload
from another public entity, for opposite reasons. This factor should not be confused
with the provisions for overhead previously defined.

•

Government Furnished Material. The COMPARE model views GFM as an
equivalent value across all offerors and therefore an unnecessary cost to include in the
comparison. The cost comparison accomplished for the SM-ALC saw the necessity
of adjusting the cost to add back savings identified by OO-ALC. The cost team found
that the savings were unsubstantiated.

•

Contract DMAG Surcharge. A factor found in the SM-ALC depot competition that is
not seen in the other competitions is the Contract DMAG Surcharge. This factor is
simply an adjustment to the OO-ALC bid to correct for a line-item deduction for the
Air Force wide 1.5% surcharge for industrial fund overhead. OO-ALC incorrectly
deducted the surcharge for the entire amount but should have included the portion of
workload that was going to be accomplished by their private partner, Boeing.

64

Table 6 provides a visual representation of the results of the cross-case
comparison. Cost factors from the Public-Private competition are matched to their
equivalent factors in the COMPARE model. Where no exact match was found, the intent
of the COMPARE category or factor was ascertained to identify similar factors.
Significant in this table are the factors that remain unmatched (identified at the bottom of
the table). These factors represent cost considerations that are unique to the PublicPrivate competition for depots.
Unmatched Factors - Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk
These items (listed below and defined in their respective cases) are distinguished
from the previous list of "Unmatched Factors" by their unique purpose.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Flow Days
Paint Facilities
WIP Warranty
Transition Risk (Labor, Commodities, and Schedule/Efficiency)
Steady State Risk
Production Risk
Each represents the dollarization (explained at the beginning of Case II) of the

strengths, weaknesses, and risk identified by members assigned to the Cost Team, PRAG,
Technical Team, and Contracting Team of the individual competitions. It is in the nature
of these factors, that the limitations of COMPARE become most apparent. There are no
provisions to adjust bids based on these factors.
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Table 6- Cross-Case Comparison: Final
A-76

SA-ALC

SM-ALC

Personnel Costs
Salaries
Wages
Other Entitlements
Fringe Benefits
Other Pay
Overseas Allowances
Material and Supply Costs
Other Specifically Attributable Costs
Depreciation
Cost of Capital
Rent
Maintenance and Repair
Utilities
Insurance
Travel
Subcontracts
Other Costs

}

Direct Material

Direct Material

Depreciateion of MCP Facilities
Cost of Facilities Capital

Depreciateion of MCP Facilities
Cost of Capital

Other Direct

Other Direct

Casualty Insurance

Casualty Insurance

Other Direct

Other Direct
Assets Storage

Overhead Costs

Additional Costs
Current to MEO Transition CostsT
Plant Rearrangements
J
Training
\
Recruitment
-^
Contract Administration Costs
Compliance Review
Payment Processing
Negotiating Change Orders
Contract Closeout Expenses

-C

Production OH
G&A

{

Production OH
G&A
BOS Costs

Other Nonrecurring Costs
Other Recurring Costs

Other Recurring Costs

Contract Administration

Contract Administration

Additional Costs
One-Time Conversion Costs
Retraining Costs
Relocation Costs
Cost of Joint Inventory
Security Clearances
Separation Incentives

State Unemployment Payments
Unfunded Civilian Retirement
RIF Costs
Govt. Transition (Personnel)
BEQ/WIP Adjustment

Gain on Assets

Cost of Facilities Capital

Cost of Capital

Federal Income Taxes

Federal Income Tax

Federal Income Tax

Phase-In Period Costs

Other Nonrecurring Costs

' State Unemployment Payments
Unfunded Civilian Retirement
RIF Costs
Govt. Transition (Personnel)
■ Govt. Transition (WIP)

Unmatched
Minimum Conversion Differential
Profit
Military Non-Depot Costs
Award Fee
Overhead Costs
Overhead Savings

Profit
Military Non-Depot Costs
Award Fee

Government Furnished Material
Contract DMAG Surcharge
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Risk
Flowdays
Paint Facilities
WIP Warranty
Transition Risk - Schedule/Efficiency
Steady State Risk
Production Risk
Trasition Risk - Commodities
Trasiton Risk - Labor
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V.

Summary

Background
An increased emphasis on achieving greater efficiencies in government operations
has led to greater use of Outsourcing and Privatization (O&P) initiatives to select an
offeror, public or private, to accomplish workload that has traditionally been achieved
only by military personnel or government civilian employees. Under the guidance of
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Circular No. A-76, Performance Of
Commercial Activities, organizations have been identified and selected for competition.
To aid in conducting the competition, a software package, called COMPARE, was
developed. The A-76 Costing Manual, produced by the DoD Competitive Sourcing &
Privatization Office, complements COMPARE. COMPARE was designed to accomplish
a very specific task: to compare a single public bid with that of a single private bid.
Further more, COMPARE was designed to accomplish this task in a standardized format
that could be applied across a wide variety of generic organizational structures.
Over time, an increasingly wider and more diverse cross-section of organizations
has become the target of consideration for O&P initiatives. The range of viable
candidates has become narrowed to the point that further competitions are becoming
increasingly difficult to model within the constraints of the current A-76 costing model
(COMPARE). Specifically, the standardized cost factors used in COMPARE are
increasingly insufficient in providing a level playing field on which decision makers can
make informed comparisons.

67

Research Questions
This thesis effort was undertaken to take a detailed look at the cost factors used in
the COMPARE model and contrast them with cost factors utilized in the conduct of the
more complex Public-Private competitions. These deviations (waivers) from the strict
construct of COMPARE are approved in acknowledgement that one model does not fit
all. This research answers the following questions:
1. What are the baseline cost comparison factors established in COMPARE?
2. What are the common cost factors found in Public-Private competitions?
3. What are the similarities and differences between the cost factors established in
COMPARE and those used in Public-Private competitions?
4. What explains the differences between the cost factors established in COMPARE
and those used in the Air Force Depot Public-Private competitions?
5. What changes can be made to make COMPARE more robust in the comparison of
more complex public and private entities?

Methodology
The research methodology most appropriate for providing responses to these
questions is that of the Case Study (see Chapter III). In order to reign in the scope of
study to a manageable level, three cases were selected as representative. The first case
represents the COMPARE model itself. Since its use is highly standardized across the
DoD, it represents all O&P cases utilizing COMPARE. Case 1 is the baseline study. To
form a basis of comparison, the Public-Private competition efforts at two Air Force
Depots were selected for Cases II and III.
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Each case was analyzed individually to identify its cost factors, and then a crosscase analysis was conducted to compare and contrast the differences between them. This
format is based on the construct of a Multiple-Case, Embedded Design, espoused by
Robert Yin (6).

Results
Detailed analysis of the three cases provided significant insight into the
differences between the COMPARE model and the Public-Private methodology.
Expectations of the limitations of COMPARE were dispelled in favor of a better
understanding of its capabilities and purpose. The following paragraphs highlight the
conclusions manifested in Chapter IV.
Low Cost vs. Best Value
The dollarization of strengths, weaknesses, and risk decisively separates the A-76
process and COMPARE from the cost comparison conducted in the depot Public-Private
competitions. COMPARE sets out to identify the offeror with the lowest cost, responsive
bid. Any concern for factoring in a bidders strengths, weaknesses, and risk is subservient
to obtaining the lowest cost to the government. The COMPARE model assumes these
risks will be attenuated by the type of service being sought (see Commercial/Core
Activity discussion below), and adherence to the theory that prices will be driven down
and quality will increase through competitive market forces.
The depot Public-Private competitions also seek the lowest cost to the
government however, the type and nature of service required mandates that best value be
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considered as a significant driving force in selecting a winning offer. Best value is
attained through thorough evaluation, quantification, and combination of strengths,
weaknesses, risk, and price.
Commercial Activities vs. Core Activities
Chapter II provided significant detail in distinguishing Core Activities from
Commercial Activities (CAs). At the inception of COMPARE, competitions were
typically for low technology or service oriented activities. Alternative commercial
sources were plentiful and the benefits of competition were easily achieved.
As the DoD continued to search for ways to become more efficient, it began to
look at activities that were clearly commercial activities, but were also increasingly
complex or had limited commercial equivalents. Lines between what was considered a
core activity and what was commercial began to blur into a continuum. Movement along
the continuum towards core activities necessitated a need for models other than
COMPARE to ensure the security of government interests. Deviations to A-76
procedures were approved and Public-Private competitions were initiated to allow
inclusion of best value as a criterion for selection of a winning offer.
The following figure provides a graphic illustration of some important
considerations in a competition model decision. It is important to remember that only
Commercial Activities are considered for Outsourcing and Privatization. The definitions
of what are and are not CAs do not change, just the interpretation. This change in
interpretation results in movement along the continuum. One extreme highlights a pure
Commercial Activity. The other typifies, a pure Core Activity. The model lists some
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significant characteristics of each. Movement along the continuum necessitates an indepth look at the desired end state of the competition. If the activity is service oriented
and there are many potential offerors, then COMPARE may be suitable. As activities
become more complex, and competition becomes more scarce, the Public-Private
competition model should be given more consideration. There is no specific point at
which a line can be drawn to delineate a model. All considerations must be taken into
account before a method is determined.

Commercial Activities

Consider
COMPARE

Public-Private

If
Competition Exists
Low Cost Desired
Low Skill Work
Low Complexity
Overhead Cost Limited
Service Oriented
Low Risk

Limited Competition
Best Value Desired
High Skill Work
High Complexity
Overhead Costs Significant
Product Oriented
High Risk

Figure 4 - Commercial Activities / Core Activities Continuum

71

Is COMPARE Enough?
Upon inception of this study, many differences, between the cost factors seen in
COMPARE and of those seen in the depot competitions, were expected. In reality, only a
few were identified. In fact, the seven major unmatched cost factors (which excludes
strength, weakness, and risk factors) could all be "custom" fit into the COMPARE model.
They were left separate to highlight the probability that most of these costs were never
envisioned for inclusion in the model.
Suitability. COMPARE was found to be quite capable of integrating many of the
cost factors used in the depot competitions. This does not mean that it is well suited to do
so. COMPARE is designed to level the playing field between a single private bidder and
a single public offeror. It accomplishes this, primarily, through adjustments to the public
bid. To integrate the many factors found in the depot competitions, great care would
have to be taken to ensure proper aggregation of applicable costs to the into the cost
categories allowed in COMPARE. The issue of including additional private offers would
also have to be addressed.
Structure. COMPARE is very rigid in its design. This rigid structure tends to
limit thinking beyond the cost factors identified in the A-76 Costing Manual (4). If a cost
comparison is conducted, strictly by the guidance provided, the opportunity exists to
leave other, possibly important, factors out of consideration. The software and the
costing manual act more like checklists to be executed rather than starting points for
exploration of necessary adjustments. In contrast, the open structure, provided in the
Cost Comparability Handbook, as seen in the depot competitions, lends itself to expand
thinking beyond factors identified.
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Recommendations
COMPARE should be modified to allow greater flexibility in the conduct of
leveling the playing field. The basic framework exists to do so. The following
suggestions represent possible solutions to questions raised during the course of this
study.
•

Eliminate the down-select of private offerers in COMPARE (see Figure 3) to

allow head-to-head comparison with more than one private bidder. This includes
changing the format to include comprehensive adjustments for each offerer rather than
the current approach which provides adjustment, primarily, of the only the public offer
(Most Efficient Organization).
•

Expand capabilities to adjust bids based on any appropriate cost factor (by

bidder). An extensive list of factors exists in the form of the Cost Comparability
Handbook (26) and the A-76 Costing Manual. Leave flexibility to include previously
unidentified factors.
•

Develop standardized tables, computational methodologies, and Cost Estimating

Relations (CERs), that can be selected where applicable/appropriate, to model each cost
factor. The ability for the cost comparison team to use alternative methodologies or
calculations must be retained.
•

Include the provision for additional leveling based on strengths, weaknesses, and

risk. Due to the highly volatile and complex nature of these factors, the best approach
may be to simply allow for the importation and integration of risk assessments
accomplished in other applications.
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•

Change the tone of COMPARE, and its associated costing manual, from that of

"here are the factors, here is how you will use them" to one of "there are many
appropriate factors, here are many of them, include others as appropriate."

Final Remarks
The conclusions of this research show that COMPARE continues to be a viable
model for the conduct of cost comparisons. The research also shows that there are some
significant limitations that must be considered when determining the most appropriate
model with which conduct Outsourcing and Privatization initiatives. Ideally, COMPARE
should be expanded to encompass a broader range of competitions. For the short term,
this does not provide the decision maker with a solution.
The contribution of this research has been to formally identify the capabilities and
limitations of the COMPARE model and to highlight areas for possible improvement.
Logical avenues for further research would be to formally develop a standardized
glossary of cost factors which encompass those identified in this research, the Cost
Comparability Handbook, and the A-76 Costing Manual, as well as those revealed
through formal evaluation (such as the Delphi technique) of subject matter experts. This
new research, along with recommendations from this thesis effort, would form the basis
for revision of DoD guidance in the conduct of outsourcing and privatization
competitions. A new model, replacing or modifying COMPARE, could then be
developed. The benefit of revised guidance, coupled with a single model for conducting
competitions, would be more thorough evaluation of important factors, improved
accuracy, and elimination of the deviation approval process for routine requirements.
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